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Abstract
The information security management standard ISO/IEC 27001 is built on the notion that information security is
driven by risk assessment and risk treatment. Fundamental to the success of risk assessment and treatment is the
decision making process that takes risk assessment output and assigns decisions to this output in terms of risk
treatment actions. It is argued that the effectiveness of the management system lies in its ability to make effective,
easytoimplement and measurable decisions. One of the key issues in decision making is ownership. In this
paper two aspects of information security ownership are considered: ownership of the asset (as per the ISO/IEC
27001 definition) and ownership of the risk treatment actions. This paper discuses how traditional information
security risk assessment methodologies confuse the ownership issue and raises the question as to whether this is
simply because they are rebadged computer security risk assessment methodologies or because the significance
and the complexity of ownership is underestimated in many forms of information security risk assessment. This
paper also presents some observations from practical attempts at implementing an organisationwide
information security risk assessment methodology. The observations were made as part of ISO/IEC 27001
certification assessment visits.
Keywords
Asset ownership, ISO/IEC 27001, information security management system, information flow modelling, risk
assessment, decision making, risk treatment, super scope

INTRODUCTION
Curiously when designing and implementing an information security management system (ISMS) there is often
very little emphasis on the ownership of information security. This is perhaps because it is a difficult issue to
identify within an organisation because to resolve it requires an articulation of the importance, or otherwise, of
information security. It is a trend that is both surprising and concerning because of the importance of ownership
when assigning roles and responsibilities for security issues. Dhillon introduced the concept of responsibility
structures and their work demonstrates the importance of identifying responsibility structures as a way of
reducing security problems by improving communication within and understanding of the organisational context.
(Dhillon 2006a)
The rise of the ‘super scope’ has compounded this lack of ownership modelling and lies at the root cause of
many of the problems identified by ISO/IEC 27001 assessors during routine audit visits. In particular the failure
to clearly identify ownership bedevils risk treatment activities and makes the decision making process within the
security forum slow and ineffective. The security forum is the way ISO/IEC 27001 defines the opportunity for
making security decisions. The ‘super scope’ brings this problem sharply into focus because whilst the
traditional ISMS scope is relatively simple in terms of organisational hierarchy, the number of processes it
addresses and the organisational boundaries that it traverses, the ‘super scope’ typically covers an entire
organisation and the ownership question is therefore much more complex.
Clear Security Ownership – a Necessity for Effective Risk Management
ISO/IEC 27001 requires that the information security management system (ISMS) is assessed for its
effectiveness: “Undertake regular reviews of the effectiveness of the ISMS (including meeting ISMS policy and

objectives, and review of security controls) taking into account results from security audits, incidents, results
from effectiveness measurements, suggestions and feedback from interested parties” (2005a). Interestingly this
clause in ISO/IEC 27001 does not directly mention the effectiveness of the risk assessment and treatment
processes and yet given the dependency that the system has on the risk management process, it is essential that
the risk assessment and treatment processes are effective for the rest of the management system to reach its
objectives. In the next clause there is reference to the effectiveness of risk assessment but only in terms of the
effectiveness of the implemented controls and the effectiveness of the decision making and sense making
processes are not discussed. For the risk assessment to result in effective risk treatment, the security ownership
of issues and assets must be clearly defined during the analysis or sense making part of this process. Interestingly
the requirement for ownership is not established at this point.
The question then becomes “what does the term security ownership mean?” Perhaps one of the most significant
changes between BS 77992 and ISO/IEC 27001 is the slight modification to clause 4.1. BS 77992 states “The
organisation shall develop, implement, maintain and continually improve a documented ISMS within the context
of the organisation’s overall business activities and risk” (2002) whereas ISO/IEC 27001 states “The
organisation has established, implemented, operates, monitors, reviews, maintains and improves a documented
ISMS within the context of the organisation’s overall business activities and the risks it faces.” (2005b). This
view is not new and is one that is often presented in information security management. It was recently cited by
Dhillon as one of a set of principles designed to help analyse secure environments “A well conceived corporate
plan establishes a basis for developing a security vision” (Dhillon 2006b). However it is the first time that such
views have been so strongly emphasised within an information security standard. The change to clause 4.1 can be
interpreted as a strengthening of the link between the ISMS and the business, making it more difficult for
organisations to disassociate the information security processes from the business objectives and the risks that
the business faces. It could be argued that this clause gives ISO/IEC 27001 certification assessors the mandate to
test the link between the business and the ISMS where the one clear place that the ISMS will link with the
business is at the risk assessment level and therefore through the business ownership of security.
The Placement of Risk and the Significance of Security Ownership
If risk assessment is to be used as one of the primary means of linking the business context to the ISMS then the
role of risk management in the wider organisational context must be understood.
There are a number of ways in which the role of risk assessment and treatment can be perceived but in the wider
risk context, risk management can be seen as a combination of sense making and decision making. Sense
making can be quite literally described as the process of “making sense” and best explained with the question:
“How can I know what I think until I see what I say?” (Wallas 1926) This makes the case that assembling one’s
thoughts on a given topic can, depending on the topic’s complexity, require an element of externalisation and
review before a view on that topic can be fully formed. One of the ways in which risk assessment externalises the
scope of the assessment is to identify the assets within the scope and assign security owners to those assets. In
order for the risk management process to be successful it is essential that the security owners of the assets have
been identified because it is through the identification of ownership that risk treatment action owners can be
identified.
The decision making aspect of risk management is primarily found in the risk treatment discussions. A decision
can be described as being composed of choice, opportunity, problems, solutions and participants (Cohen et al
1974) and the decision making process itself can be described as “making a choice from the various courses of
action open to the decision maker” (McKenna 2006). Viewing risk management as an aspect of decision making
is one way to start to understand the allencompassing nature of the process and the fundamental role that
security ownership has to many of the decisions that business faces. This view is further reinforced if the
traditional picture of the ISMS is restructured to fully reflect the central role of risk management as part of the
decision making process.

Figure 1 – The traditional view of the ISMS

Figure 2 – Placing risk assessment and treatment as part of the decision making phase
By explaining the flow of the ISMS in this way the reality of how organisational risk assessment and treatment
takes place in many aspects of organisational life is more accurately demonstrated and illustrates the fact that the
effectiveness of the information security management system in large part hangs on the effectiveness of the risk
management processes as part of its decision making. If risk management actions are without clear ownership
then the risk management actions can not be effective. This is not a novel view, in the risk mitigation process that
is defined in NIST SP 80030 (2002), the assignation of responsibilities is a specific step within the process.
Dhillon (2006c) reenforces this view by identifying the need for ownership in a number of the stages within the
risk assessment process. However in practical terms this requirement becomes more salient when the
effectiveness of the ISMS is part of the assessor’s scope of enquiry.

THE ROLE OF SECURITY OWNERSHIP WITHIN TRADITIONAL INFORMATION
SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
There are many information security risk assessment methodologies and in many of these methodologies the
issue of ownership appears to be marginalised. In this section the extent is assessed to which ownership is
addressed within both a typical computer security approach and a typical business focussed approach to risk
assessment.

Standard Approaches to Information Security Risk Assessment
The most traditional of the risk assessment methodologies is the one described in ISO/IEC TR 133353 and this
traditional risk assessment process has a number of phases:
Figure 2 in section 9.3.3 of ISO/IEC TR 133353 (1998) identifies the process flow of risk assessment as
follows:
1.

Identification of assets to be included in the risk assessment

2.

Valuation of assets and establishment of dependencies between assets

3.

Threat and vulnerability assessment on the assets within the scope of the risk assessment

4.

Identification of existing or planned safeguards

5.

Assessment of risks

This description provides the traditional computer security view of the risk assessment process and it is intended
that the ownership is identified as part of the asset identification but no discussion or guidance on this topic is
evident within the document.
The ISO/IEC TR 133353 approach compares with the following, more businessorientated approach, from
Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) where the steps in a commercial information
security risk assessment are summarised in six steps by Sherwood et al (2006):
1.

Identify and value the assets

2.

Identify the possible threats

3.

Identify and quantify these impacts by relating back to your asset list

4.

Identify and quantify these vulnerabilities or weaknesses

5.

Identify the possible control strategies and quantify the cost (total cost of ownership) for these controls

6.

Quantify the benefits and the costs

Again the issue of ownership is marginalised and links ownership with cost of controls and yet there are two
aspects of ownership to be considered: ownership of the asset and ownership of the control to treat the risk. Total
cost of ownership implies a combination of both types of ownership.
In order to comply with ISO/IEC 27001 both the assets within the scope of the ISMS and the owners of those
assets have to be identified (2005c). Owners are defined in ISO/IEC 27001 as “the term “owner” identifies an
individual or entity that has approved management responsibility for controlling the production, development,
maintenance, use and security of the assets. The term “owner” does not mean that the person actually has
property rights to the asset.” (2005d) The distinction that ISO/IEC 27001 is drawing here is an important one:
the ownership of the security management aspects of an asset as opposed to ownership in terms of rights to the
asset. In traditional risk analysis terms this ownership is often seen as ownership at the data set level. This is
further supported by ISO 17799 which includes in control 7.12 the requirement that the ownership of assets is
identified. The control states “All information and assets associated with information processing facilities should
be owned by a designated part of the organisation” (2005e). The clause goes on to provide the following
implementation guidance: “the asset owner should be responsible for:
•ensuring the information and assets associated with information processing facilities are appropriately
classified;
•defining and periodically reviewing access restrictions and classifications, taking into account
applicable access control policies.
Ownership may be allocated to:
•a business process;

•a defined set of activities;
•an application; or
•a defined set of data”
Therefore in order for the information security management system to ensure that corrective and preventive
action instructions are effectively implemented, the asset identification and ownership which sits at the heart of
the modelling phase of the risk assessment process must be accurate and appropriate and this must be translated
into identification of owners for risk treatment action items.
Marrying the ISO 27001 Requirements with Traditional Risk Methodologies
As has already been seen, remarkably little is documented about asset identification and security ownership in
information security risk assessment methodologies. This may be due to the fact that the majority of information
security risk assessment methodologies are in fact largely computer security risk assessment methodologies
which belong to era when assets were relatively static, easy to identify and security ownership was in large part
linked to the ownership of the physical asset. In addition the use of the term “asset” is synonymous with the
financial asset register and an organisation often sees its assets in terms of physical assets, software assets and
information assets. A risk assessment methodology such as CRAMM (UK Government's Risk Analysis and
Management Method) (2006) will try and collate those assets as a support structure for a particular “service “
where service may be a business or, more typically, a technical service. The difficulty with this “bottom up”
approach is that the security ownership is illdefined because it is unclear as to how ownership of security issues
is to be assigned from within the business. For example: should they be assigned to the process or to the assets
supporting the process? By trying to model assets in this way it becomes clear that security ownership is not
solely a product of the sense making process but is also a product of the decision making process because in an
asset model that is composed of multiple assets a method of assigning ownership for security issues is required
and this is an activity that logically resides within the decision making portion of the overall risk management
process. Clarity of ownership becomes critical as the scope of an ISMS increases in complexity. Small, simple,
homogeneous scopes can rely on informal methods of assigning ownership but once the scope becomes complex
and heterogeneous and a clear understanding of ownership is essential for the scope to be maintained.
The Rise of the Super Scope and its Implications for Security Ownership
Traditionally a certification scope to ISO/IEC 27001 (BS 77992) has been small, homogeneous with a relatively
flat decisionmaking structure. In many cases the extent of the scope has been a single department, for example
HR or IT, a single office with one prime organisational unit or a business function contained within a single
organisational unit. In this type of scope a traditional computer security risk assessment asset model works
relatively well. The number of information assets is relatively small and the security ownership is often aligned
to the IT infrastructure. It is relatively easy for the decision making process to assign ownership in this case as
the decision making hierarchy is relatively flat and ownership travels across few organisational unit boundaries,
if any.
However this ‘pillar’ model of asset ownership does not scale to the more complex ISMS scopes. These scopes
are in many ways ‘super scopes’ and have the following characteristics: complex decision making hierarchies,
the risk assessment of process which crosses multiple organisational units and scopes which have a high saliency
for the business objectives of an organisation. It is noticeable that a super scope may not be a large scope but it
does have increased organisational complexity in comparison with its smaller, business unitcentric cousin. The
complexity of the scope means that security ownership is no longer so clearcut and the sense making and
decision making processes need to be modified in order to accommodate this change.

Modifying the Sense Making Process for the Super Scope
One asset definition model that appears to fit the super scope rather well is one that is reminiscent of the seven
layer TCP/IP model and to the CRAMM asset model but it allows for both general and processspecific models
to be built. It is a fourtiered model, constructed as follows in descending order:
•Business process layer
•Application layer
•Network layer
•Infrastructure layer
This is a business approach which enables the risk assessment to directly link to the business aims and
objectives. It is a multi owner model where the different layers may have different security owners. The order of
precedence in terms of ownership between the layers and the assignment of security issues is identified as part of
the decision making process. In many ways this model is aligned with the information system security classes
presented by Dhillon where the three classes of strategic, administrative and operational are presented as a way
of identifying types of decisions which belong to different aspects of the business. In such a model Dhillon
points out that there is often a degree of overlap between the layers. (Dhillon 2006d) This is equally true of the
fourlayer model proposed here where ownership of security issues has to be negotiated.
Modifying the Decision Making Process of the Super Scope
As has already been identified, in order to make effective risk treatment decisions the ownership of security
issues needs to be clearly defined. Perhaps the most common place for this to take place is in the decision
making opportunity entitled the “security forum”. This is a vehicle which is identified by ISO/IEC 17799:2005
as an opportunity for the discussion of security issues with the relevant parties.
In a multiowner model a possible approach is to define a facilitator role as part of the risk treatment process and
which uses the security forum to support the relevant stakeholders in the risk assessment to identify risk
treatment actions and as part of that role ensures that ownership is assigned. The security forum need not
necessarily include stakeholders from one organisation only. There are numerous implementation examples
where a security forum includes parties from multiple organisations and at this point a facilitator to help assign
ownership becomes even more significant.
The role of a facilitator is not a new one in information security risk assessment methodology. The prime
example of the risk management process that uses a facilitator is FRAAP  the Facilitated Risk Analysis and
Assessment Process (FRAAP) (2005). The process was designed by Peltier and is a qualitative risk assessment
process where the key feature is that the business drives the risk assessment process and the security analyst acts
as a facilitator. In this approach the facilitator is present in both the risk assessment and treatment processes.
Peltier is not the only analyst to point out the need for a facilitator. Kleckner has also outlined the need for a
facilitator in an information security risk assessment. Unlike the definition of the role in FRAAP, Kleckner’s
description of the role requires knowledge of the different aspects of information security (Kleckner 2001),
whereas FRAAP requires general facilitation skills. It is argued that both aspects are required and as part of the
role the facilitator must also help the organisation to assign security issue ownership with in the decision making
process.

IMPLEMENTATION OBSERVATIONS
Super scopes appear to be on the increase and one of the major impacts of the complexity associated with such
scopes is the resulting complexity in the information security management processes. The processes that are
most strongly impacted are those involving risk management. A super scope requires a more complex decision
making process which in turn implies a more complicated structure for decision making. It also requires a more
complex risk assessment process which in order to be appropriate for the organisation typically needs to be a

multimethodology so that the appropriate type of assessment takes place at the appropriate layer within the
organisation. Another aspect of the super scope which needs to be carefully thought out is that of asset
inventories and the assignment of ownership. Observations from the field show that many super scopes still
adopt a computer asset approach to identifying assets and this results in problems, not only within the risk
assessment process itself, but the degree to which the risk management process can demonstrate itself to be
effective.
The following are three examples of observed approaches to asset identification and ownership. All examples
were observed in super scopes.
One-tiered Asset List with Business Ownership
In this example the asset list is ISfocused and the asset list is divided into a list of information systems that are
regarded as essential to the business. There are two lists, a top twenty and a top fifty list of assets. Business
owners are assigned to each asset and the asset is valued by identifying the impact of loss of that asset to the
business. A two tier system of risk assessment is carried out. Firstly a highlevel risk assessment is performed
and then a more technical risk assessment at project level is completed. Risk treatment decisions are made at
specially convened meetings where information security analysts act as facilitators. Ownership for risk treatment
actions is assigned to the asset owner, although the asset owner may choose to delegate the risk treatment action.
The effectiveness of the decision making process appears weak in this model. The business owners appear
unwilling to make risk treatment decisions and the most frequent decision is that of risk acceptance. The
attendance of business owners at these meetings is also fairly low and erratic resulting in a relatively low rate of
decision making indicating that they do not see the risk treatment process as one that is of a high priority. Given
that in a super scope these assets are essential to the business, this finding is surprising and raises questions
about how far the risk management processes have been integrated into the business.
The risk assessment findings do not seem to identify any significant risks and yet in a super scope it would be
expected that at least some aspect of critical assets were at risk, even if this was a risk to be accepted. This leads
to questions about the quality of the assessment itself and whether the correct inputs are being included in the
initial analysis. One of the key inputs into the risk assessment process is the asset list and ownership assignment.
Maintaining a centralised asset list seems to prove difficult in super scopes and the frequency with which asset
lists are reviewed seems to decrease over the certificate lifecycle. In addition the accuracy of the list is also
questionable as ownership change is not captured. It becomes clear that in order to manage the asset inventory
and the ownership mappings a number of processes must include the maintenance as part of their remit,
including change control, management review and internal audit.
One-tiered Asset Ownership with Centralised Ownership
In this example the asset ownership and therefore the security issues are owned by a centralised information
systems function. The security ownership of all issues associated with the information sits with this central
function and controls to address the issues are decided centrally. In this model there is no business ownership.
The asset ownership model follows the traditional hardware, software, information asset listings. The risk
assessment which accompanies it is a traditional information security risk assessment that considers the impacts
on confidentiality, integrity and availability to each of the assets listed and is closely aligned to computer
security risk assessment methodologies.
Whilst the decision making process is relatively fast in this model, the effectiveness of the decisions is erratic. It
relies on the cooperation of the business that uses the assets and this is not always obtained in this model. Areas
where the central information systems function can not make decisions, is largely ignored in this process, leaving
areas of risk decision making uncontrolled and erratic. There is also a tendency to select technical controls and
not consider other control types, including: training and awareness, policy controls or locally administered
technical controls. This does not necessarily result in the most effective risk treatment decisions being made
each time.

The risk assessment output from this type of model has the feel of a computer security risk assessment and has
little resemblance to the way in which the business perceives its involvement in security issues and security
management. It is particularly noticeable that the risk assessment output in this type of model contains no
mention of assets once they leave the centralised IS structure and attempts are made by security managers to
deem such instances of assets “out of scope”. This particularly applies to information assets as they are moved on
to memory stick or use nondigital communication.
It is also difficult from such risk assessment output to reconstruct the business involvement in the security
issues, even though the business was typically used to generate the findings in the first place. This makes it very
difficult to trace business ownership or even obtain business buyin for subsequent risk treatment proposals.
Asset list maintenance in this type of model is relatively easy but at the expense of ignoring the more volatile,
mobile data assets. The asset list is very IS focused and does not have much bearing on the business use of the
assets.
Multi-tiered Asset Ownership with Transversal Process Ownership
The multitiered asset ownership is perhaps the model that super scopes are most likely to gravitate to because
the model proves the most effective way to embed security ownership into the organisation. The asset model is
based on the business process which runs transversally across the organisation. The business processes are tiered
and the security management processes are embedded within each tier. There are several tiers of ownership:
business ownership which owns the process end to end and functional ownership which own the components that
support the process. Often the component ownership is maintained by pillar functions within the organisation.
Security issue ownership is achieved through the various security fora by assigning ownership of issues to
process owners who may delegate the risk to “risk custodians”, who is often the functional owner supporting an
aspect of the process. A risk might be treated at the process, application, network or physical asset layer and a
decision is made in the security forum as to the best course of action.
There are two possible sources of conflict in this model: a conflict between the process owner and a potential
risk custodian who does not wish to assume such a role, and a conflict between process owners where a change
desired by one process owner conflicts with the functionality desired by another process owner. In each instance
a security forum facilitator tries mediate locally. If the local mediation fails, the issue is escalated to another
forum.
It is noticeable that this model has also scaled across organisational boundaries and been used in the
management of third party services where information is shared between parties. In this type of model decision
making is often faster, the types of solutions that are selected, more diverse and it produces an output that is
more likely to engage the business. Asset lists are maintained as part of standard business process maintenance
and can be modified to scale across organisational boundaries.

CONCLUSION
ISO/IEC 27001 assessors must take the issue of security issue ownership modelling into account when they
assess an ISMS because the effectiveness of the information security management processes are completely
dependent on this model as it is the mechanism through the which the business engages with security and
assumes security as part of its day to day operation. This requirement entails that there must be much better
models of asset definition and of decision making within information security risk processes that are capable of
effective implementation within complex scopes and that are enshrined as part of the guidance that supports the
ISMS standard.
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